Well, this is pretty interesting. Roman Catholic beliefs produce characteristic neural responses to moral dilemmas. I’m posting it without further comment:
This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief.
Eleven Catholics and thirteen Atheists (all female) [my emphasis] judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction [TPJ]) and utilitarian moral judgments (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [DLPFC]; temporal poles [TP]), whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus [SPG] for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex [PCC] during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas, and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex [ACC] and superior temporal sulcus [STS] during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas.
Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances –but thou shalt not kill.
Actually I do have a comment: There’s probably a reason why they went with an all female sample group.
So I’m taking a course on Coursera called Buddhism and Modern Psychology. As the course title might suggest, it’s a course about the intersection of Buddhist thought and modern findings in psychology. It’s a pretty interesting course, piquing my interest in Buddhism (again) and also learning some neat new stuff about psychology and meditation.
My first homework assignment is due pretty soon, so I thought I’d reblog (so to say) the work I’m going to submit here on my blog. The assignment:
The Buddha makes the claim, which may draw some support from modern psychology, that the self does not exist. Describe the self that the Buddha says does not exist and explain the Buddha’s principal argument against it. Do you agree or disagree with the Buddha’s argument that this kind of self doesn’t exist? Or are you unable to take a position? Give two specific reasons for your view, and explain your reasons support either the existence of the self or the non-existence of the self, or why they explain why you are unable to take a position on the question.
The Buddha’s main argument is premised on his conception of the makeup of a person. That makeup is composed of the five aggregates. The five aggregates are form (physical body) feeling, mental formations (emotions, desires), perception, and consciousness (subjective awareness). Buddha goes through the qualities that are thought to be associated with the aggregates and says that the “self” cannot be made up of them.
Impermanence is his main argument against the self, so he must have thought the self has a sort of persistence; something that does not change through time and space. Additionally the Buddha thought of the self as being associated with being under control, however the Buddha argued that the self cannot control feeling or form (e.g. you can’t will yourself to be happy, or decide to grow an extra arm), or any of the other aggregates, so therefore the self as he conceived of it does not exist.
On the other hand, the self or something like it has to exist if you are being “liberated”. So it is argued that the Buddha wasn’t speaking literally about the self not existing but argued more from an instrumental perspective. In order to get someone to actually accept the impermanence of things, one has to understand the impermanence of the individual “parts” of a person like their form or mental formations. Indeed, the Buddha teaches that the self exists for karma purposes when making ethical pronouncements.
The Buddha’s formulation of the self as being composed of five aggregates matches with modern psychology’s view of the mind and brain. The brain might also be composed, not of five aggregates, but of modules; each module having a specific function. Beyond this, there doesn’t seem to be any further overlap. The modular mind view in psychology is much more specific than the Buddha’s general five aggregates; though both systems make it hard to pinpoint where exactly a “self” would reside. In both modern psychology and Buddhism, there seems to be a rejection of the Cartesian theater model of the self that most everyday people have of themselves.
I would have to say that I am convinced by the Buddha’s argument that the self doesn’t reside in any of the five aggregates, but not because the aggregates lack persistence over time. Even without his rationale that the self is supposed to have a sort of permanence or has the quality of being “under control”, it would be hard to locate a sort of CEO, king, or even Cartesian theater version of the self in any of the five aggregates. This is not the Buddha’s argument (or if it is, I’ve not heard it yet) but it very well could be that your form affects your feeling and mental state, or your mental state affects your consciousness/awareness and perception. Each of the five aggregates can influence any of the other aggregates so it would be hard to cordon off one aggregate and claim that that one in particular is where the self resides.
(Note: I didn’t put the hyperlinks in the one I actually submitted)
This is a lecture given by Ara Norenzayan describing some of his findings about the sociology behind religious beliefs.
Some of the things he touches on briefly in his lecture (which he said he goes into more depth in his book Big Gods):
Whether religions are the result of a cognitive byproduct model or an evolutionary/sociological adaptation/benefit model. The cognitive byproduct model I first read about in Richard Dawkins’ book The God Delusion, though psychologists and sociologists are coming more in line with the evolutionary adaptation model of religion (though the two aren’t necessarily in opposition). The adaptation model of religions is where religion isn’t a fluke of human cognition, but was specifically selected for by evolution. Or rather and more simply, that religious people had more reproductive success than the “non-religious” (whatever that would mean in the Pleistocene). And, it wasn’t just any old religion; it had to be a religion that promoted prosociality.
As an example of a successful religion vs. an unsuccessful religion, Norenzayan compares the Mormon church with the Oneida Perfectionists, who both started around the same time in the same location in the US. Mormonism had a growth rate of about 40% per decade (about the same rate as original Christianity), while the Oneida perfectionists only lasted about 30 years before disbanding; the remnants went on to become a silverware company.
Norenzayan then lists some reasons for why religions become successful:
- moralizing god spread over increasing individualism to combat the observation that proximity + diversity = war
- extravagant displays or synchronous behaviors/rituals
- inculcate self control
- moral realism: Our morality is the true morality
- high fertility rates
Norenzayan also mentions that the more abstract ones conception of god is, the less they think said god cares about morality and/or punishes bad behavior. So someone who believes in a completely abstract “ground of being” god more than likely also believes that this god doesn’t care too much about morality. Whereas someone who believes in a god that cares a great deal about morality simultaneously believes that said god is also much more anthropomorphic. At one end of the spectrum is the god of the philosophers/Sophisticated TheologiansTM, at the other is the god of fundamentalists.
* Small foraging societies typically don’t have moralizing gods. Big societies generally have moralizing gods. Causal or correlational?
* Economic games and small/big religions: Big religions, that is, the world religions, show more cooperative behavior in economic games. Small religions are more selfish. Again, causal or correlational?
* Belief in god in and of itself doesn’t correlate with any behavior in monetary generosity (belief in god per se doesn’t lead to moral behavior; you need to go to church to reap the benefits! And you get those same benefits being an atheist in church). Though in the context that Norenzayan was mentioning this fact, it was in the context of religious priming. Just declaring theism didn’t make someone more cooperative, but religious priming does. On the other hand, being non-religious makes you sort of impervious to religious priming; though secular priming has the same cooperative effect on the non-religious.
* Prosocial behavior correlates with a belief in a punishing god. Belief in a forgiving god correlates with cheating. Same for hell/heaven belief, respectively (though belief in hell seems to make people less happy).
* Religious communes last longer than secular communes; religious ones are more strict. Again… causal or correlational?
It looks like oxytocin is a double edged sword. I’ve written before about how oxytocin is the bonding hormone but it also seems to promote behavior that’s not so becoming, like collectivism and other sorts of in-group bias. Of course, collectivism is correlated with conservatism, religiosity, and racism.
Grounded in the idea that ethnocentrism also facilitates within-group trust, cooperation, and coordination, we conjecture that ethnocentrism may be modulated by brain oxytocin, a peptide shown to promote cooperation among in-group members. In double-blind, placebo-controlled designs, males self-administered oxytocin or placebo and privately performed computer-guided tasks to gauge different manifestations of ethnocentric in-group favoritism as well as out-group derogation. Experiments 1 and 2 used the Implicit Association Test to assess in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Experiment 3 used the infrahumanization task to assess the extent to which humans ascribe secondary, uniquely human emotions to their in-group and to an out-group. Experiments 4 and 5 confronted participants with the option to save the life of a larger collective by sacrificing one individual, nominated as in-group or as out-group. Results show that oxytocin creates intergroup bias because oxytocin motivates in-group favoritism and, to a lesser extent, out-group derogation. These findings call into question the view of oxytocin as an indiscriminate “love drug” or “cuddle chemical” and suggest that oxytocin has a role in the emergence of intergroup conflict and violence.
Oxytocin also promotes lying for the group you identify with:
According to a new study by researchers at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) and the University of Amsterdam, oxytocin caused participants to lie more to benefit their groups, and to do so more quickly and without expectation of reciprocal dishonesty from their group.
“Our results suggest people are willing to bend ethical rules to help the people close to us, like our team or family,” says Dr. Shaul Shalvi of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev’s Department of Psychology and director of BGU’s Center for Decision Making and Economic Psychology.
Dr. Shalvi’s research focuses on ethical decision-making and the justifications people use to do wrong and still feel moral. Specifically, he looks at what determines how much people lie and which settings increase people’s honesty. Very little is known about the biological foundations of immoral behavior.
“Together, these findings fit a functional perspective on morality revealing dishonesty to be plastic and rooted in evolved neurobiological circuitries, and align with work showing that oxytocin shifts the decision-maker’s focus from self to group interests,” Shalvi says.
This isn’t really surprising, given the purpose of oxytocin. It seems to be zero sum: The more you bond with someone/some group, the less you bond with the real or hypothetical “other”. I’m wondering if oxytocin would also promote increased religiosity in the same way that being prompted about death makes people more religious; that collectivism or “fear of strangers” link is there so it seems plausible.
I was looking through some old posts of mine, searching for the word ἄνωθεν::anothen that’s used in the double meaning in John 3 but I couldn’t find what I was looking for. The closest I had was this post on Justin Martyr’s use. I assume I must have written what I’m about to write here in an IRL letter to someone instead of on my blog.
Anyway, anothen is defined at Perseus as meaning “from above, from on high”. The author of John uses this word as a double entendre in John 3.3, 16; evidencing that the conversation must have occurred in Greek since such a double meaning doesn’t exist in any other language. Here it is, in the author’s context:
3 Jesus replied, “Very truly I tell you, no one can see the kingdom of God unless they are born again.
3 ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ: ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ.
I had done a word search of the word anothen in the NT that returned only 13 results; and in the vast majority of instances it is used to mean “from above”. Like in Mark 15.38 // Matt 27.51, where the curtain of the temple rips in two from top to bottom (εἰς δύο [ἀπ'] ἄνωθεν ἕως κάτω). Three are used in the epistle attributed to James to mean “from above” as well. Five of them are found in John, three in chapter 3 and two in chapter 19; the three in chapter 3 are used in the double meaning sense. The ones in chapter 19 are meant in the from above sense.
Paul uses anothen to mean “from the beginning” in Galatians 4.9, and Luke/Acts uses it in the same manner at Luke 1.3 and Acts 26.5. This fits the evidence that Luke and Acts were written by the same hand, and maybe even had some sort of relationship to Paul… though that would be irresponsible to conclude that just from the use of this one word.
I suppose the English metaphor “taking it from the top” fits how anothen was used in antiquity; it could mean literally taking it from somewhere really high up or starting from the beginning. The metaphor might even be due to the nature of writing itself. If you read this blog post from the top you are also reading it from the beginning, and I assume that ancient Greek playwrites also wrote from the top to the bottom and is why the word anothen has both meanings in Greek.
My most recent post on this, On Advertizing Science, has a lot of info on why effective methods of persuasion are not only related to how religions spread, but are also related to how other ideas spread effectively. Here is another metastudy done on how persuasion efficacy correlates with financial success. Summarized by Less Wrong:
Ng et al. performed a metastudy of over 200 individual studies of objective and subjective career success. Here are the variables they found best correlated with salary:
Predictor Correlation Political Skills 0.29 Education Level 0.29 Cognitive Ability (as measured by standardized tests) 0.27
(all significant at p = .05)
(For reference, the “Big 5” personality traits all have a correlation under 0.12.)
The strongest predictor of salary (tied with education level) is what the authors politely term “Political Knowledge & Skills” – less politely, how good you are at manipulating others.
Several popular books (such as Cialdini’s Influence [ed: Also on my blog]) on the subject of influencing others exist, and the study of these “influence tactics” in business stretches back 30 years to Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson. Recently, Higgins et al. reviewed 23 individual studies of these tactics and how they relate to career success. Their results:
Tactic Correlation Definition (From Higgins et al.) Rationality 0.26 Using data and information to make a logical argument supporting one’s request Ingratiation 0.23 Using behaviors designed to increase the target’s liking of oneself or to make oneself appear friendly in order to get what one wants Upward Appeal 0.05 Relying on the chain of command, calling in superiors to help get one’s way Self-Promotion 0.01 Attempting to create an appearance of competence or that you are capable of completing a task Assertiveness -0.02 Using a forceful manner to get what one wants Exchange -0.03 Making an explicit offer to do something for another in exchange for their doing what one wants
So there are a couple of take-homes from this. The one I’m focusing on most is that you shouldn’t box yourself into a one-or-the-other situation when it comes to trying to influence others. In the definition above, “rationality” might be more clearly defined as presenting just the facts. Sure, presenting just the facts seems like it should work on persuading someone all on its own, but the delivery counts almost equally as much. Combining the two — being both likable and having the facts on your side — would work much better than just relying on one or the other.
The author continues:
This site [Less Wrong] has a lot of information on how to make rational appeals, so I will focus on the less-talked-about ingratiation techniques.
How to be Ingratiating
Gordon analyzed 69 studies of ingratiation and found the following. (Unlike the previous two sections, success here is measured in lab tests as well as in career advancement. However, similar but less comprehensive results have been found in terms of career success):
Other Enhancement, or “flattery”, had a weighted effectiveness of 0.31. Opinion Conformity, or “go along to get along”, had a weighted effectiveness of 0.23.
The others were a 0.15 or below. Note that “flattery” is sometimes too obvious to be effective. You can do more subtle flattery by doing things like asking someone for a favor or their opinion on something.
The author concludes:
One important moderator is the direction of the appeal. If you are talking to your boss, your tactics should be different than if you’re talking to a subordinate. Other-enhancement (flattery) is always the best tactic no matter who you’re talking to, but when talking to superiors it’s by far the best. When talking to those at similar levels to you, opinion conformity comes close to flattery, and the other techniques aren’t far behind.
Unsurprisingly, when the target realizes you’re being ingratiating, the tactic is less effective. (Although effectiveness doesn’t go to zero – even when people realize you’re flattering them just to suck up, they generally still appreciate it.) Also, women are better at being ingratiating than men, and men are more influenced by these ingratiating tactics than women. The most important caveat is that lab studies find much larger effect sizes than in the field, to the extent that the average field effect for the ingratiating tactics is negative. This is probably due to the fact that lab experiments can be better controlled.
It’s unlikely that a silver-tongued receptionist will out-earn an introverted engineer. But simple techniques like flattery and attempting to get “sponsored” can appreciably improve returns, to the extent that political skills are one of the strongest predictors of salaries.
Again, notice the persuasion techniques of religious groups. They don’t focus on facts and data. Rather they focus on the people element, designing an environment where they will appear likable. They intimate that belonging to their group is beneficial; implying that belonging to their group will give you all of the feels. A truly formidable persuasion artist would combine both the good feeling of belonging to the group and accurate, well referenced facts.