RSS

Category Archives: religion

Why Sexism and Racism Never Diminish–Even When Everyone Becomes Less Sexist and Racist

Are people susceptible to prevalence-induced concept change? To answer this question, we showed participants in seven studies a series of stimuli and asked them to determine whether each stimulus was or was not an instance of a concept. The concepts ranged from simple (“Is this dot blue?”) to complex (“Is this research proposal ethical?”). After participants did this for a while, we changed the prevalence of the concept’s instances and then measured whether the concept had expanded—that is, whether it had come to include instances that it had previously excluded.

…When blue dots became rare, purple dots began to look blue; when threatening faces became rare, neutral faces began to appear threatening; and when unethical research proposals became rare, ambiguous research proposals began to seem unethical. This happened even when the change in the prevalence of instances was abrupt, even when participants were explicitly told that the prevalence of instances would change, and even when participants were instructed and paid to ignore these changes.

Read more at Marginal Revolution

Advertisements
 
Leave a comment

Posted by on July 5, 2018 in religion

 

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

Abstract

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.

First published: 19 June 2018
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2086

 
Leave a comment

Posted by on June 20, 2018 in religion

 

The New Fundamentalism

Secularism is increasing in the West. The Millennial generation, even in the USA (which is the most religious Western country), is disproportionately the least religious generation.

I was never a big fan of religion. It’s why I started this blog, to archive my notes (literally ὑπομνήματα or “hypomnemata”; “notes”, the underscore of this blog)

and thoughts on the academic scholarship of why religion exists and persists. Indeed, to go beyond just religion, and find out why people believe what they do, in spite of all of the evidence that might refute or contradict their beliefs. So this wave of secularism and its trend towards universal prominence should be a good thing to me right?

Maybe.

Religion isn’t some aberration. The seeds and ingredients that make us believe are baked into our cognition. This goes for the stellar community generating aspects as well as the insidious divisive parts. And it follows that, even though people are becoming less religious in the West, the constituent parts of religiosity, the things that made us religious in the first place, will persist. It’s these parts — completely and utterly inherent to our cognition — that makes religion terrible. Yet religion isn’t unique in its terribleness.

The vast majority of people neither convert nor deconvert from religion due to pure intellectual reasons. Most deconvert due to moral failings they see in their religion or their religious leaders. And this is a problem. Matthew said it best:

Matthew 12

43 When an unclean spirit comes out of a man, it goes through arid places seeking rest and does not find it.
44 Then it says, ‘I will return to the house I left.’ When it arrives, it finds the house unoccupied, swept clean and put in order.
45 Then it goes and takes with it seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and they go in and live there. And the final condition of that man is worse than the first.

The short of it is this: Who cares if we’re becoming less religious when the irrationality that made us believe in the first place is still there? That same irrationality will lead us to replace the old fundamentalism with a new one.

I’ve written a few posts, not just explaining why people believe what they do, but what people might believe in the future; a future where Christianity (in the West) is a minority belief.

Removing The Unclean Spirit of Religion: Communities built around pseudoscience and woo will probably fill the void left by religion

Nature or Nature’s God: Any new “religion” will have both its nuanced version and its lowest common denominator version floating concurrently in the wider memespace; in the battle of ideas, the most popular ideas are optimized for virulence… not for truth

“If I Think Really, Really Hard, I Can Get The Right Answer”: The average person’s brain is optimized for making friends and influencing people. Not figuring out what’s true. Thinking you can figure out what’s true without first getting the proper tools for figuring out what’s true is folly; thinking that you already have those tools is worse. You have to not only constantly use the tools, but be wary of using the tools improperly.

Truth vs. Morality; Rationality vs. Intuition: There will always be scientific truths that are made as a burnt offering to an ethical theory. Most moral or ethical theories have some facet of anti-epistemology by dint of tribalistic human nature. This tribalism usually manifests and calls their anti-epistemology Other Ways Of KnowingTM

Take all of these together, and what will most likely fill the void left by organized religion in the minds of Millennials and beyond will be something that is primarily an ethical theory. It will be good at building communities around itself and will be optimized for spreading, not optimized for truth.

The thing that will make it the new fundamentalism, just like the old fundamentalism, will be the tendency to demonize any scientific findings that might be weaponizable and used against the primary aims of the ethical theory. This will be especially true for any science that makes humanity seem no better or worse than other animals; these ethical theories that assume that we are outside of and beyond our animal cousins are always threatened by this science. If you can predict someone’s response to a scientific question using their ethics, then you are probably dealing with a nascent fundamentalist.

As I wrote before, a group that organizes on the premise of some social or moral cause (like religion), and is also defending “the truth”, will inevitably lead to terrible behavior akin to those horror stories that atheists like to blame on religion.

I have a feeling that this sort of thing will continue indefinitely: Old fundamentalisms replaced with their newer incarnations. And it will continue to happen. The best we can do, as I wrote in Nature or Nature’s God, is to try to take advantage of our overwhelming need for tribalism and redirect it towards goals that both benefit humanity and don’t shy away from uncomfortable truths.

 
Leave a comment

Posted by on June 12, 2018 in cognitive science, religion

 

How do you explain the mysterious beauty of this planet without referring to a supreme being?

I’m from NYC. This question would be the equivalent of me saying “how do you explain that I was born in the most awesome city on the planet without a supreme being?”

Of course, almost everyone says their home town is the best ever. Why do you think that is? I think the answer to that is the same as the answer to your question.

But let’s get a bit deeper into the assumptions behind your question. What’s your logical link from “Earth is beautiful” to “therefore a supreme being”? In other words, what makes something a good explanation?

If I were to say that something is a chair, there are qualities that chairs have in common that define them as chairs instead of beanbags: Chairs have four legs, a back support part, a part to sit on, etc. There should be some similar consistent criteria for what constitutes a good explanation, and why you think this creates the necessary link between “Beautiful Earth” and “Supreme Creator”.

If you get home late and your boyfriend/girlfriend asks why you’re late, what would be a good explanation? Why is “I got stuck in traffic” better than “I was kidnapped by aliens”? We know the former is more believable, but why?

Well, you might say something like “traffic causes people to be late more than getting kidnapped by aliens does”. And that would be correct. But I argue that this isn’t enough to separate good explanations from bad explanations, and it isn’t enough to explain why your link from “Beautiful Earth” to “Supreme Being” is a strong or weak link.

Since this isn’t a dialog, I’ll have to just explain another quality of a good explanation: Good explanations are specialized. Meaning, they explain what they intend to explain and that’s it. An explanation that can be used to explain some situation, but then can also be used to explain its polar opposite, isn’t a good explanation.

So, if instead of getting home late, you got home early, and your boyfriend/girlfriend asks why you’re early, then saying “because I got stuck in traffic” doesn’t make sense. The stuck-in-traffic explanation is specialized for only making people late. But “I got kidnapped by aliens” works just as well for making someone late as it does for making someone early. Once you invoke aliens, then anything is possible.

main-qimg-a8973bd9618be2fcfa54b4fe0875dbb0-c

Let me repeat that last sentence more generally: Once you invoke [bad explanation], anything is possible.

This is a real important concept to grasp. Bad explanations, because they’re not specialized, allow for any possible outcome. And the more possibilities your explanation allows, the less likely it is that your explanation is responsible for a specific problem. There’s only one explanation that can allow for any possible outcome: Pure randomness.

Both qualities of good explanations I’ve enumerated here — a good explanation is more commonplace (e.g., “traffic causes people to be late more than getting kidnapped by aliens does”) and more specialized — follow directly from probability theory. So they’re not things I’ve just made up.

So back to the question at hand: How do you explain the mysterious beauty of this planet without referring to a supreme being? Why do you think a supreme being is a good explanation? Are supreme beings commonplace? Are supreme beings only responsible for beauty, or is anything possible for a supreme being?

I think we know the answers to those questions.

 
Leave a comment

Posted by on May 14, 2018 in Bayes, Quora answers, religion

 

A Life of Pretending: Being Egyptian and Atheist

At the age of 10, ‘Amr’s failure to memorize the Qur’an brought him beatings, the force of which he resented even then. Voiced skepticism throughout his youth earned him further harsh treatment from family members, whose religious discipline he recalled growing progressively more strict along with gradually closer subscription to the channels of Gulf-based imams. Upon coming to terms with his own atheism, ‘Amr – like the vast majority of nonbelivers in Egypt – took pains to keep it to himself.

His girlfriend barely spoke a word, but ‘Amr wasn’t nearly finished. With much more to say than the time in which to say it, he suggested we carry on talking in a downtown café. Here, he said, he’d recently spent a good amount of time with a growing group of Egyptian atheists, all of whom he’d met online, sharing similar experiences and venting frustrations with life as a nonbeliever in one of the world’s most religiously restrictive countries. These gatherings were like manna for ’Amr. He heard dozens of accounts comparable to his own – stories of being evicted, forcibly medicated, losing jobs, being blacklisted from entire industries, losing friends, families – wives, husbands, children – and, for an unlucky few, jail.

Read more at Quillette

 
Comments Off on A Life of Pretending: Being Egyptian and Atheist

Posted by on April 17, 2018 in religion

 

Ambidextrous people tend to be less religious, study suggests

Research published in 2004 found that strongly handed individuals were more likely to believe in biblical creationism rather than biological evolution. The original study proposed that strongly handed individuals were less likely to update their beliefs in light of evidence. But Chan wondered if other factors could explain the association.

The new study of 743 U.S. adults confirmed that handedness was correlated to religiosity. The strongly handed participants were more likely to agree with statement such as “There is a personal God” while disagreeing with statement such as “Religion makes people do stupid things.”

Chan also found evidence that authoritarianism mediated the relationship between handedness and religiosity. In other words, strongly handed individuals tended to score higher on a measure of right-wing authoritarianism, which in turn was associated with stronger religious belief.

Read more at PsyPost

 
1 Comment

Posted by on March 20, 2018 in religion

 

The Monty Hall Problem Refutes Your Religion

Well the title of this post is a bit inflammatory. So I won’t be arguing that it “refutes” your religion, but will be arguing more that it’s weak Bayesian evidence against your religion.

So. The Monty Hall problem is an illustration of how our intuitions of probability don’t always match up with reality. In its original formulation, you’re given a choice between three doors. One door has a prize, the other two do not. If you choose one of the doors, then another door that doesn’t have a prize is shown to you. You then have the option of staying with the door you chose or switching doors.

Most people think that it either doesn’t matter whether you switch or that switching lowers your probability of winning. Neither of those is true!

Your initial probability of winning the prize is 1 out of 3. Once one of the doors is opened, the probability that you had picked the correct door stays at 1 out of 3 whereas the other non-picked door now contains the remaining probability of 2 out of 3. Because you have to do a Bayesian update once new information — in this case, the one door revealed to not have the prize — is introduced.

I’ve gone over this before. Yet, I want to add an additional wrinkle to the problem to make intuition fall more in line with Bayesian reasoning.

If, instead of picking one door out of three to win the prize, what if it were one door out of 100? And once you’ve made your selection, 98 other doors are opened up to show that they have no prize, leaving only your choice and one other unknown door? In this case it seems more obvious that something is suspicious about the only other door that wasn’t opened up. And this intuition lines up with a Bayesian update using the same scenario:

P(H): 1 out of 100 or .01

P(~H): 99 out of 100, or .99

P(E | H): Probability of all other doors besides yours and one other being opened to reveal no prize given that you’ve picked the correct door: 100%.

P(E | ~H): Probability of all other doors besides yours and one other being opened to reveal no prize given that you’ve picked the incorrect door is 100%.

This is an easy Bayesian update to do. Both conditional probabilities, P(E | H) and P(E | ~H) are both 100%. Meaning the likelihood ratio is 1, and your posterior probability is the same as your prior probability. But now your selection is still 1 out of 100 and the only other remaining door has a probability of 99 out of 100 of having a prize! So in this case, both Bayesian reasoning and intuition line up: There is something suspicious about the only other door that wasn’t opened.

How does this relate to religion? Specifically, the religion that you grew up with?

Using Willy Wonka’s logic in the meme above, the chance that you just happened to grow up with the correct religion is pretty low. Instead of the chance of picking the correct door out of 3, or out of 100, you’ve picked a door out of thousands of religions; many of which no longer exist. They are “opened doors” revealing no prize in the analogy.

So a Bayesian update will work the same way as it did with picking one door out of 100. Meaning, your religion is probably wrong. And you should probably switch religions. The only reason I say this is weak Bayesian evidence is because there are still a few religions to choose from. But their joint probability of being correct is yet higher than the single chance that your family religion is the correct one.

Analogously, it would be like if, say, you had a choice between choosing one door out of 10,000, and after your choice all but 10 of the doors are closed. Your initial chance of having chosen the correct door is still 1 out of 10,000, but the 10 doors that remained open after closing the rest have a joint probability of 9,999 out of 10,000 of being the correct door: Those 10 other doors individually have (approximately) 10% chance of being the correct door. As opposed to your original selection’s probability of 1 out of 10,000.

So the Monty Hall problem is weak Bayesian evidence against your religion.

 
2 Comments

Posted by on March 5, 2018 in Bayes, religion

 
 
NeuroLogica Blog

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

Slate Star Codex

THE JOYFUL REDUCTION OF UNCERTAINTY

Κέλσος

Matthew Ferguson Blogs

The Wandering Scientist

What a lovely world it is

NT Blog

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

Euangelion Kata Markon

A blog dedicated to the academic study of the "Gospel According to Mark"

PsyPost

Behavior, cognition and society

PsyBlog

Understand your mind with the science of psychology -

Vridar

Musings on biblical studies, politics, religion, ethics, human nature, tidbits from science

Maximum Entropy

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

Skepticism, Properly Applied

Criticism is not uncivil

Say..

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

Research Digest

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

Disrupting Dinner Parties

Feminism is for everyone!

My ὑπομνήματα about religion

The New Oxonian

Religion and Culture for the Intellectually Impatient

The Musings of Thomas Verenna

A Biblioblog about imitation, the Biblical Narratives, and the figure of Jesus